In this paper, we propose a novel Secure Name Service (SNS) framework for enhancing the service availability between collaborative domains (e.g., extranets). The key idea is to enforce packet authentication through resource virtualization and utilize dynamic name binding to protect servers from unauthorized accesses, denial of service (DOS) and other attacks. Different from traditional static network security schemes such as VPN, the dynamic name binding of SNS allows us to actively protect critical resources through distributed filtering mechanisms built in collaborative domains. In this paper, we present the architecture of the SNS framework, the design of SNS naming scheme, and the design of authenticated packet forwarding. We have implemented the prototype of authenticated packet forwarding mechanism on Linux platforms. Our experimental results demonstrate that regular Linux platforms are sufficient to support the SNS authenticated packet forwarding for 100Mbps and 1Gbps Ethernet LANs. To further improve the performance and scalability, we have also designed and implemented unique two-layer fast name lookup schemes.
Introduction
As we become more and more reliant on the Internet for a variety of networking services, the number of network security attacks with the aim to abuse or disrupt such services has also significantly increased. Furthermore, the sophistication of cyber attacks has also increased. The emergence of massive distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks is one such example. Unfortunately, because of the decentralized and open nature of the Internet, it is nearly impossible to protect the entire Internet from cyber attacks. In addition, the cost of such a solution will be economically prohibitive, due to the sheer size of the Internet. It is therefore important to selectively secure and protect Internet services that are critical.
In this paper we propose a novel approach -Secure Name Service (SNS) -to protect critical Internet services in collaborative domains (e.g., extranets for business partners) from cyber attacks. As a result, transactions between partners will not be stopped by attacks and servers are not clogged by attacking traffic. The proposed SNS mechanism serves as a comprehensive first-line of defense against unauthorized accesses, intrusions as well as DOS attacks.
SNS is built upon an extension of the standard domain name service (DNS).
The basic ideas behind the SNS approach are as follows: A critical Internet service for trusted business partners and its associated resources (e.g., servers, databases, etc.) are placed within a (virtual) secure zone in the network domain of the service provider, and correspondingly the names of the service and its resources are placed within a secure name space, separate from the standard domain name space. Unlike DNS, where in response to a query for a host name, the corresponding IP address of the host is returned, SNS only answers queries originated from trusted collaborative network domains, and returns a so-called secure handle (SH) instead of an IP address in response to a query for a secure name. In other words, the IP addresses of protected resources such as servers are always concealed from the requesters (even from a trusted domain), and the protected resources are in essence virtualized from both trusted and untrusted users. Consequently, an unauthorized user cannot gain access to a protected resource (say, a server) directly via IP address spoofing. Furthermore, legitimate packets from a trusted domain carry security authenticators -generated by the trusted domain based on secure handles -and are verified before they can enter the secure zone containing the protected resources.
In this paper we describe the proposed SNS architecture, which is comprised of two key mechanisms: i) secure name service, supported by secure name servers that virtualize protected resources within secure zones, set up security associations (SAs) between domains, and perform resolutions for secure names; and ii) authenticated packet forwarding, supported by security checkpoints (SCs) , security gateways (SGs), and secure IP layer (sIP), which verify security authenticators, filter out illegitimate packets, and map secure handles to the IP addresses of protected resources. In addition to proactive protection, we also explicitly incorporate active monitoring and response mechanisms into the proposed architecture for further ensuring the availability of critical services.
We will first introduce the SNS naming service, supported by SNS servers, SNS-aware DNS servers, SH managers, and SNS stub resolvers. This mechanism is in charge of establishing secure associations between SNS domains, managing the key distribution within an SNS domain, supporting secure name resolutions, and maintaining the mapping between different identities in authentication.
We then present the design of the SNS authenticated packet forwarding, supported by sIP layers at hosts, SGs of secure zones, and SCs of secure domains.
An sIP layer at a host authenticates and translates regular IP packets into SNS packets, and vice versa. An SG authenticates secure packets from hosts, other SGs, or SCs of the same domain and then forwards these packets to corresponding parties based on their security mapping. An SC authenticates packets from SCs of other secure domains or from SGs of its local domain. We have implemented prototypes of these components in Linux Kernel 2.4.20 and evaluated their performance through experiments. The performance and scalability of SGs are the critical issues in the SNS forwarding mechanism because SGs need to perform a secure name translation for each packet. To address these issues, we further design and implement two fast lookup schemes and evaluate their performance through analysis, simulations and experiments.
The SNS framework exhibits several unique characteristics. Different from traditional static network-layer security schemes such as VPN, the SNS framework combines name service and network-layer security into a unified framework to protect critical service through resource virtualization and dynamic name binding. Different from traditional authentication schemes such as Kerberos, the SNS framework provides an active defense mechanism against various attacks at the network level via packet filtering and adaptive forwarding paths. In particular, the dynamic naming binding of SNS allows us to take advantage of multiple routes in SNS domains to ensure the availability of services even when some security components are clogged by attacking traffic.
Different from previous attack prevention schemes such as SOS and Onion
Routing that require relative large-scale infrastructures, the SNS framework can be deployed incrementally in a domain-by-domain fashion.
SNS has its limitations. First, it focuses on packet authentication. Since most applications in collaborative environments employ various security techniques (e.g., TLS) to address the issues of data integrity, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation, we emphasize packet authentication to mitigate attacks at the network layer. Furthermore, because we have limited resources in trusted SNS domains to deal with flooding attacks on SCs and SGs, to further enhance service availability, we may have to employ resources from a third-party to build a protection hierarchy for restricting attack traffic from untrusted domains to these points. In addition, SNS does not address the issue of entity authentication in a domain. Instead, it uses existing approaches such as Kerberos for this purpose.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first present the architecture and components of the SNS framework, and then discuss related work. In Section 3 we describe the design of SNS naming scheme. We present the design of authenticated packet forwarding components and the prototype of these components and our experimental evaluation in Section 4.
In Section 5, we devise two fast lookup schemes for secure name translation and evaluate their performance through analysis, simulation and experiments.
We conclude the paper in Section 6.
SNS Architecture and Components
To protect critical resources from unauthorized accesses and DOS attacks, we need multiple levels of security mechanisms to thwart different security threats, e.g., packet replay, flooding, or IP spoofing. In this paper, we propose the SNS framework as the first-line of defense to filter out invalid packets and actively protect to critical resources. Fig.1 shows the setting of the SNS framework for two collaborative domains. The secure name space consists of secure domains, and each secure domain is comprised of an SNS server, several secure zones and a number of security checkpoints (SCs). An SNS server manages all secure zones and SCs in a domain. Each secure zone has one or more security gateway(s) (SGs) which are responsible for secure packet forwarding for the hosts of the zone.
As shown in Fig.1 , we attach an SNS server to a leaf DNS server of the DNS tree, e.g., SN S 1 is attached to DN S 1 and SN S 2 is attached to DN S 2 . For secure communication between these two domains, we first build a security association (SA) between them using their SNS servers. Based on this SA, these two domains are able to resolve secure names and authenticate packets from each other by inserting a packet authenticator into each packet. For interdomain packets across insecure networks, we use SCs at the borders of SNS domains to validate them based on their inter-domain authenticators. For packets within an SNS domain, we use SGs to validate them based on their intra-domain authenticators. In addition, each host in a zone authenticates itself to an SNS server before it uses an SG for secure communications.
Through resource virtualization and packet authentication, SNS is capable of protecting critical servers from unauthorized accesses and malicious flooding attacks. The key idea of SNS is to virtualize the identities of critical resources in SNS-enabled domains by concealing their IP addresses through secure name service. Different from a regular DNS name resolution that returns a static IP address as the identity of a host, a secure name resolution returns a 32-bit secure handle (SH) as the identity of a critical host. This SH is mapped to the real IP address of the host in the SNS framework by SGs, and the IP address is only known to the SNS server and associated SGs. Because this virtualization allows us to decouple the static IP binding, we can not only protect critical hosts from attacks originated from untrusted hosts, but also dynamically adjust the binding to defeat attacks originated from compromised trusted hosts in real-time.
The packet authentication in the SNS forwarding path allows us to build multiple defense mechanisms along the path and apply various security policies at SGs and SCs. When a client at a remote domain exchanges packets with a critical server via a secure handle, packets are authenticated by SGs and SCs on the path between the client and the server. These SGs and SCs filter out invalid packets based on packet authenticators and actively take actions against attacks. In the meantime, they also monitor traffic in order to detect intrusions and brute-force DOS attacks. They can also be used by sophisticated intrusion detection systems to identify and isolate compromised trusted hosts.
In addition to packet authentication, the SNS framework also helps us dis-tribute security check load along packet forwarding paths such that critical services are not clogged due to the considerable security-check load on servers under heavy attacks. Furthermore, the dynamic name binding of SNS allows us to build a distributed filtering mechanism within secure domains. We can choose a different packet forwarding path between two domains when one ingress SC is dragged down by attacking traffic while another SC is normal.
Utilizing this dynamic mechanism, we are able to actively adapt to different attack patterns to enhance service availability. We will study the issue of maximizing the service availability, given a set of SCs between two domains.
Furthermore, we will also study the issue of building an SNS overlay network such that SNS packets can traverse multiple SNS domains before reaching their destinations, in order to further exploit different paths between SNS domains.
Related Work and Discussion
In the following, we briefly review the related work in naming security, traffic security, entity authentication, and proactive and reactive defense schemes.
For naming security, DNSSEC [1, 2] mostly focuses on protecting the authenticity and integrity of DNS databases and DNS responses. It uses the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to generate digital signatures for the authentication of the origin and integrity of DNS queries/responses. Although DNSSEC is indeed an effective way to avoid DNS forgery, it does not address the issue of protecting services under attacks. VPNs based on IPsec [3, 4] or L2TP are common approaches used to address the traffic security issue for extranets.
TLS [5] ensures the security at the transport layer. Kerberos [6] is designed for entity authentication that allows a client and a server to mutually authenticate each other across an insecure network. However, VPNs, TLS, and Kerberos do not address the issue of service protection and active defense for ensuring service availability.
Existing mechanisms to deal with DOS attacks are often classified into proactive and reactive approaches. Proactive approaches eliminate packets with forged source addresses, such as ingress filtering (RFC2827), Secure Over-lay Service (SOS) [7] , Mayday [8] , and VPN Shield [9] . Ingress filtering uses known unambiguous traffic information to filter out invalid packets at an ingress point, such as source addresses or destination addresses. Therefore, it is suggested for stub domains and low-rate ingress links, but not for transit domains and high-rate links. Ingress filtering does not preclude an attacker using a forged source address within a legitimate prefix filter range. SOS requires a wide-area overlay infrastructure with a large number of intermediate nodes to filter out attacking traffic. VPN Shield provides a limited capability of reacting to flooding attacks.
Reactive approaches for DOS attacks include firewalls, IP traceback [10] , link testing, input debugging [11] , controlled flooding [12] , logging [11] , ICMP trace-back [13] , packet marking [12, 10] , aggregate-based congestion control, etc. They all require either the coordination of human administrators of related domains or the modification of intermediate routers. The complexity of the coordination and the slow error-prone human actions hinder the effectiveness of these approaches. Furthermore, these approaches only work when attacks have caused some damage, and are less useful to stop unknown attacks.
Secure Name Service (SNS)
We present the design of secure name service in this section. The main features of the SNS naming system are 1) to build security associations (SAs) between SNS servers, where an SA includes the IP addresses of corresponding security gateways and secret keys for packet authentication between domains; 2) to resolve secure name queries from trusted hosts; 3) to maintain a secure name database for secure name resolutions; 4) to authenticate hosts, security gateways, and checkpoints in a domain, and manage corresponding security keys and identities in order to ensure intra-domain packet authentication between hosts and gateways (or between gateways and checkpoints).
To support these features, we design the SNS naming system consisting of SNS servers, SNS-aware DNS servers, SH managers at SGs, and stub resolvers at hosts. Within an SNS domain, we use an SNS server to authenticate all parties in the domain and manage their key exchanges. We also use the SNS server to maintain a secure name database and resolve secure name queries for the domain. We further use SNS-aware DNS servers to help SNS servers to set up SAs between domains in order to perform cross-domain secure name resolutions and packet exchanges. In addition, we use SNS stub resolvers at hosts and SH managers at SGs to recognize, authenticate, and forward secure queries and responses to/from SNS servers. Lastly, we use SNS servers and SH managers to ensure the correct mapping between different identities along packet forwarding paths. In the following, we first introduce key concepts used in SNS and then present the details of these components.
Secure Name Convention and SNS Identities
In order to facilitate a smooth transition of existing applications from the DNS name space into the SNS name space, we choose the following approaches.
First, we let SNS use the same query interface as DNS such that no changes are required for running these applications in the SNS name space. Furthermore, to distinguish secure name queries and DNS name queries at the same interface, we define an secure naming convention based on the DNS naming scheme: For a host with a DNS name x.y.z.w, we define its SNS domain name as x sec.y.z.w, by replacing the bottom label x with x sec. As a result, we can easily migrate a host from the DNS name space into the SNS name space and support applications to access both the secure and the regular name space at the same time in the transition process.
In the SNS naming framework and forwarding mechanism, we define other three identities combining with an IP address to represent a host at different stages of packet forwarding, i.e., Secure Handle (SH), Host ID and External Identity. Because SNS uses the same query interface as DNS, we only have a 32-bit field in a response of a secure name query. Therefore, we use a 32-bit secure handle (SH X ) in a response as the SNS identity to represent a destination host X at an SG when a packet is sent from a host to the SG. This SNS identity is viewed as a virtual IP address by applications, and it is used in the authenticated packet forwarding in a secure zone from a host to an SG. When a packet is forwarded from an SG to a host, we use the host IP address to represent the host. Because we hide each host behind an SG, to represent each host at the SG, we also assign a host identifier H ID X to a host X. Using this host ID, we further define a pair (SG IP X , H ID X ) as the external identity of host X outside its home zone, where SG IP X is the IP address of the SG for host X.
Components of SNS Naming System
SNS server SNS servers are the key components in the SNS naming framework, which perform in the control functionalities of the SNS framework, such as building cross domain SAs, maintaining secure name databases, resolving secure name queries, authenticating all parties in a domain and managing their key exchanges. In the following, we focus on the establishment of SAs and introduce secure name resolution in Section 3.3. We leave the details of intra-domain key management and secure name database in a technical report [14] .
In order to establish trust relationship between SNS domains, we assume that an SNS server i obtains a certificate C i from a trusted third party (TTP) through a public key system such as PKI. The C i includes its name SN S i and its public key KU i . Consequently SN S i is able to use its private key KR i to sign data exchanged with other SNSs over insecure networks. We denote the security parameter of an SNS server i as A i , where
is its external identity; KU i is its public key; and Y i is its Diffie-Hellman public value; SG IP i is the IP address of its SG; H ID i is its host ID at its SG. When SN S i needs to set up an SA with another SNS, it uses KR i to sign its security parameters KR i (A i ), and send this signature with its C i and A i to another SN S j . Upon receiving this message, SN S j verifies the signature using C i and A i in the message. After two SNSs validate each other's signature, they compute a shared secret key based on exchanged Diffie-Hellman public values and then use this key for their SA. For ease of discussion, we assume all SNS servers have chosen the same Diffie-Hellman parameter a and q, where q is a large prime and a is a prime root of q. In the following, we introduce a detailed protocol for exchanging security parameters with the help of SNS-aware DNS servers.
SNS-aware DNS server
We extend a leaf DNS server into an SNS-aware DNS server such that the SNS service can utilize the DNS service as a bootstrap point for basic naming service. Utilizing the recursive service at leaf DNS servers, SNS servers are able to exchange security parameters for building inter-domain SAs without revealing their IP addresses. As shown in Fig.1, we attach an SNS server to a leaf DNS server, where DN S 1 is the authoritative DNS name server for domain 1 and SN S 1 is its SNS name server, and DN S 2 is the authoritative DNS name server for domain 2 and SN S 2 is its SNS name server. We make two minor changes on a DNS server. First, we add a new DNS resource record of type RR SN S , in which the RDATA field [RFC1034] is used to pass the security parameter of an SNS server. Second, we add a new type of DNS query and response, named T SN S . Corresponding to this type of query/response, we add a few operations utilizing the recursive service at leaf DNSs, as illustrated in Fig.2 . We present the protocol in the following.
(1) When SN S 1 needs to set up an SA with SN S 2 , SN S 1 sends a DNS query Q 1 of type T SN S to its DNS server DN S 1 . The QNAME of Q 1 includes the name of DN S 2 , where DN S 2 is the authoritative DNS server of SN S 2 . The additional section of Q 1 includes a resource record of type RR SN S , whose RDATA field holds A 1 , the security parameter of SN S 1 . The header of Q 1 has the recursive desired (RD) bit set for demanding DN S 1 to perform a recursive service.
(2) During the recursive service for Q 1 , DN S 1 first finds the IP address of DN S 2 through standard DNS service, shown as Q 1 and R 1 (or multiple iterative queries). Then DN S 1 generates a DNS query Q 2 of type T SN S to DN S 2 , in which the QNAME is a NULL string, the recursive desired (RD) bit is set, and A 1 is passed in the additional section. SNS stub resolver We replace a standard DNS stub resolver with an SNS stub resolver at a client host. This SNS stub resolver has the same interface gethostbyname() as a standard DNS stub resolver. While it forwards regular DNS queries to a DNS server as a DNS stub resolver, it is also able to recognize a query for a secure name based on the secure naming convention, and forwards the query to its SNS server for secure name resolution. In other words, this resolver acts as the entrance of the secure name space with no changes SH Manager An SH manager maintains an SH database for all secure names
at an SG such that the authenticated forwarding mechanism at the SG is able to map SHs to their external identities or IP addresses of local hosts in secure name translations. We use a cache-only SH database at an SG, which is first initialized by an SNS server with local secure names and then populated by cached remote names. Since this database is searched for each secure packet translation at an SG, we must ensure fast lookups in this database. We develop fast lookup mechanisms in Section 5.
SNS name resolution
A secure name resolution maps a secure name into an SNS identity (an SH).
The basic process of resolving a secure name query is shown in Fig.4 . An SNS stub resolver S 1 at a host recognizes an SNS query Q for the identity of a secure name X, and then forwards this query to its SNS. When this query arrives at SG 1 , SG 1 authenticates this message and then forwards it to SN S 1 .
SN S 1 looks up its secure name database and finds the external identity of X, 2 A secure IP layer is a component of the SNS authenticated forwarding mechanism introduced in Section 4, which is configured with the SH of an SNS.
i.e., (SG IP X , H ID X ). (If X is not in the database, SN S 1 will obtain the external identity of X by issuing a secure name query to SNS server SN S 2 that manages secure name X, as depicted in Fig.5 . We refer readers to [14] for the details of this process.) Then SN S 1 passes the external identity of X to SH manager M 1 at SG 1 in a response R . Upon receiving R , M 1 first checks if the external identity of X is in its SH database. If it is, M 1 finds SH X from the database; otherwise, M 1 inserts an entry into the SH database for this external identity and obtains SH X . Then, M 1 sends a response R to S 1 with the SH X as the response to query Q. We are currently implementing this SNS naming framework. We have implemented the authenticated packet forwarding mechanism as introduced in the next section.
Authenticated Packet Forwarding

Design of Authenticated Packet Forwarding
The secure packet forwarding mechanism consists of secure IP (sIP) layers at end hosts, security gateways (SGs) of secure zones, and security checkpoints (SCs) of secure domains. As shown in Fig.6 , domain U has an SC C1 and an SG G1 that is responsible for secure name translations of secure zone A.
When a client needs to access a remote secure host dst, it first obtains the secure handle SH dst through a secure name resolution. It then uses this SH as the destination IP address for the packet sent to G1. G1 forwards a packet to the secure destination based on the SH.
An sIP Layer at a host is a small patch to the regular IP layer. When initialized, this layer authenticates itself to an SNS server using a Kerberos-like mechanism based on a pre-configured secret between the host and the SNS. As a result, it obtains a host ID, a host key, the IP address of its SG and SH SN S from the SNS. It uses these parameters for secure communications and secure name queries. For outgoing traffic, the sIP layer intercepts an out-bound regular IP packet destinated to a secure handle, translates it into a host-secure IP packet, and then forwards this packet to an SG. For incoming traffic, the sIP layer captures an in-bound host-secure IP packet from an SG and checks Translation (SPT), in which the SG first uses the secure handle to look up the destination address and keys, and then translates the packet into a zone-secure packet and forwards it to the destination gateway. Notice that the destination of a zone-secure packet is a remote SG. When a destination gateway receives a zone-secure packet, it first checks its authenticator. If invalid, the packet is dropped. Otherwise, the packet is translated into a host-secure packet, and then forwarded to the destination host. An additional feature of an SG is to monitor and report suspicious host activities. As a result, we can detect and isolate compromised hosts at SGs.
An SC authenticates ingress or egress secure packets. Using Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) announcements, we can control the routes of egress/ingress packets to be routed to chosen checkpoints. An egress zone-secure packet is forwarded from an SG G to an SC C, and it has a zone authenticator generated using the shared keys between G and C. If C finds that the authenticator of a packet is invalid, the packet is dropped. Otherwise, it translates the packet into a domain-secure packet by replacing its zone authenticator with a domain authenticator, and forwards this packet to the ingress checkpoint C of the destination domain. If C finds that the domain authenticator of a packet is invalid, the packet is dropped. Otherwise, C translates the packet into a zonesecure packet by replacing its domain authenticator with a zone authenticator.
It then forwards the packet to the destination gateway. In the SNS framework, we use border routers to route packets to SGs through SCs such that we can use SCs to filter out invalid packets to SGs and distribute the security check load along the forwarding path.
Illustration of Authenticated Packet Forwarding
We use an example as shown in Fig.6 to explain how the SNS framework achieves the secure communication between Host src in Zone A of Domain U and Host dst in Zone B of Domain V , without revealing their IP addresses. Assume an application on host src first obtains a secure handle SH dst of host dst, and it then constructs a regular IP packet using SH dst as the destination address, as shown in Fig.3 .a. Before this packet is passed the link layer at src, it is intercepted by the sIP layer at src. The sIP layer recognizes this packet by its secure handle, and then translates it into a host-secure packet, as shown in Fig.3 .b.
The packet is then forwarded as a regular IP packet. When the packet reaches gateway G1 of Zone A, G1 translates the IP packet into a zone-secure packet, and forwards it to checkpoint C1, as shown in Fig.3 .c. The packet has a source IP address of IP G1 and a destination IP address of IP G2. Based on security parameters between G1 and C1, G1 generates and inserts a zone authenticator (A G1 C1) into the packet. As shown in Fig.3 .c, the destination host ID H ID dst and the remote zone ID Z ID B are also inserted into the packet to ensure this packet is correctly routed to the host dst. Moreover, the source host ID H ID src and the source Zone ID Z ID A are also inserted into the packet in order to provide sufficient routing information for return packets to be routed back to host src when they return to G1.
We use BGP announcements to influence the routing tables in domain U such that the above zone-secure packet from G1 to G2 is forwarded to Checkpoint C1. At C1, we first check the zone authenticator A G1 C1. If invalid, the packet is dropped. Otherwise, we compute a domain authenticator A C1 C2
to replace A G1 C1, as shown in Fig.3 .d. Similarly, we use BGP announcements to direct packet routing between domain U and V such that the above domain-secure packet is forwarded from Checkpoint C1 to Checkpoint C2 across regular IP networks in between. At C2, we first check the domain authenticator of a packet using its remote SA Index SA U. If invalid, the packet is dropped. Otherwise, we then generate a zone authenticator A C2 G2. As shown in Fig.3 .e, we replace A C1 C2 with A C2 G2 in the packet and forward it to G2. Upon receiving the zone-secure packet, G2 first checks if its zone authenticator is valid. If valid, G2 does a reverse SPT by translating the packet into a host-secure packet as shown in Fig.3 .f; otherwise, G2 drops the packet. Furthermore, G2 looks up its SH database to check if it needs to insert a new entry in the database because it needs to remember how to route a return packet from Host dst to Host src. When the host-secure packet arrives at host dst, the secure IP layer recognizes it as a secure packet based on the protocol field in its IP header. It first translates the host-secure packet into a regular IP packet, and then puts this new packet into the IP input queue.
Consequently, an application at Host dst receives a regular IP packet as shown in Fig.3 .g.
To be practical, we must address the issue of fast packet authentication, translation and forwarding as well as the scalability of SGs in supporting a large number of hosts. In Section 4.2, we evaluate the performance through our prototype on Linux and present the detailed costs of these components. In addition, we present fast SH lookup mechanisms in Section 5.
Prototype and Experimental Evaluation
We have implemented the prototypes of sIP layer, SG and SC in Linux kernel 2.4.20 using Linux Netfilter for evaluating SNS authenticated packet forwarding. We refer readers to [15] for the details of the implementation and present the performance results in the following. Aes-cbc-mac 2738 12708
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We insert a 32-byte packet authenticator (as shown in Fig.7 ) at the end of each choose Class E addresses as SHs in our testing for outgoing packets.) If it is, the sIP layer translates the packet into a host-secure packet. In the translation, the sIP layer first allocates 32-byte space for an authenticator from the tail room of an sk buff using Linux sk buff management function skb put(). it generates a MAC using hmac-md5 (RFC2085) and its host key.
Using the time stamp counter (TSC) of Pentium CPUs to directly read CPU clock cycles, we are able to measure the delay at each step of our implementation in clock cycles. We first measured the delay of four MAC generation functions using public-available codes from NIST, OpenSSL and IETF. As shown in Table 1 , Hmac-md5 performs the best in both delay and memory. Table. for Blowfish and 9925 clock cycles for AES. These heavy costs make the two approaches impractical for the MAC generation. In addition, if we use preprocessed key schedules for Blowfish and AES, their memory requirements are rather high because we need maintain many keys on SGs and SCs. For example, if we need 65536 keys at an SG, using blowfish requires more than 133MB memory to store sub-keys, while using AES needs more than 11MB memory for sub-keys. Therefore, we choose hmac-md5 in the our implementation.
We present the additional delays caused by SNS components for authenticated packet forwarding in Table 2 . We performed a stress test of sIP layer by sending a large number of UDP packets of 1024 bytes over a direct link between two hosts. In the first row, we show the measured average delays of authenticator initialization and MAC generation for a packet at a source host. The average delay of a packet caused by the sIP layer is 6879 cycles (3.44µs). In addition, we also measured the effect of sIP on end-to-end bandwidth using Iperf from NLANR (www.nlanr.net). On a 100Mbps dedicated link, we achieve a raw transmission rate of 93.9 Mbps over regular IP and a raw transmission rate of 91.9Mbps over sIP, 98% of the rate using IP. Furthermore, we performed a similar stress test of an SG and measured the average delays of packet authentication, secure packet translation, and MAC generation, as shown in the second row of Table 2 . We connect host H1 to H2 through H3, which acts as an SG, as shown in Figure 9 . The average delay of a packet caused by an SG is about 3.40 µs. Moreover, we performed a similar test in which H3 acts as an SC. The results are also shown in the third row of Table 2 .
The average delay of a packet caused by an SC is about 3.33 µs. In summary, in a complete forwarding path from a source host to a destination host, the total extra delay caused by SNS forwarding components (sIPs, SGs and SCs) is about 20.34 µs. In the meantime, the last column in Table 2 also shows that our prototype can support a forwarding rate around 300 MBps, which is sufficient for a LAN environment with a 100Mbps or 1Gbps link. These experimental measurements on our prototype implementation have shown the feasibility of constructing SNS using regular PCs for common LANs.
Dynamic Table Management at an SG
The SH lookup mechanism of an SG is critical to its performance and scalability because it needs to lookup an SH for each packet from a potential large address table. Therefore, we focus on this issue in this section.
Table Operations and Requirements
In the process of secure name translation at an SG, we need to authenticate and translate an incoming secure packet based on its address pair (IP G, ID H) or an outgoing packet based on its SH, where IP G is the 32-bit IP address of a remote security gateway and ID H is a 16-bit remote host ID. To ensure the correct mapping in both incoming and outgoing directions, we need both an SH and a (IP G, ID H) pair of the same flow to point to the same entry in the address table. Different from traditional dynamic table mechanisms, which only access tables through a primary key, we need to use both a pair of (IP G, ID H) and an SH to access an address entry. For a packet from a remote domain, we need to use its (IP G, ID H) as a primary key to find (or insert) its forwarding information into the address table, and then return an SH as the source IP address of a secure packet. As a result, when a local host sends a packet back to the remote host, it uses this SH as the destination address. When this return packet arrives at an SG, the SG directly accesses the corresponding address entry based on the SH. As a result, we are able to hide the (IP G, ID H) pair from a local host. Because we need to use both a primary key and an SH to access the same dynamic table, we cannot directly apply existing dynamic table management schemes such as linear hashing.
Therefore, we design a two-layer data structure to address this issue. At the lower layer, we use an Address Entry Pool consisting of address entries, which allows us directly to access address entries using its indexes as SH's. At the upper layer, we build a dynamic directory for fast lookups based on a primary key, i.e., (IP G, ID H) pair. For an insertion, we use a primary key to insert an address entry in the address table and return an index of the entry pool as a direct access handle (i.e., SH). For a lookup, we can either search the table based on a pair of (IP G, ID H) or directly access an address entry using an SH.
For fast lookups based on (IP G, ID H) pairs, we design a multi-level directory scheme and a single-level directory scheme described in the following. The corresponding structure of entry pools is shown in Figure 10 . The multi-level directory scheme is shown in Figure 10 .a, where each directory entry is corresponding to a unique address table entry. The single-level directory scheme is shown in Figure 10 .b, where each directory entry is corresponding to a linkedlist of table entries. In this scheme we need to compare primary keys to check if an entry is on the list.
The basic operations on the address table are insertion, lookup, and deletion.
We focus on fast insertion/lookups in this paper. We have designed an efficient scheme to delete/recycle expired entries, which is presented in [14] , due to the space limit of this paper. We have two types of insertions. In an SNS Insertion, a local host queries an SNS server for the address of a remote host. The SNS server performs a secure name resolution for this query, passes the (IP G, ID H) pair to a local SG, demands the SG to insert an address entry into the table for the (IP G, ID H) pair, and returns an SH to the local host, such that packets from the host will be forwarded correctly. In a Routing Insertion for an incoming connection, an SG inserts an address entry into the table and translates the incoming (IP G, ID H) pair into an SH, for setting up a correct reverse forwarding path. We also have two types of lookups. In an SH-Direct Lookup, an SG needs to translate a packet from a local zone into a packet to a remote zone, and it uses the SH carried in the packet header to directly retrieve an address entry. In a Routing Lookup for an existing incoming connection, an SG already has a table entry with a corresponding SH. When a packet from the same remote host with the same (IP G, ID H) pair arrives, the SG finds the existing SH corresponding to the (IP G, ID H) pair, and uses this SH for packet forwarding between a local host and itself.
Dynamic Directory Schemes and Their Performance
We design two dynamic-directory schemes to achieve fast lookups and insertions. We first propose a Multi-Level Directory Scheme. Let us denote a 48-bit We also design a Single-Level Hashing Scheme to reduce potential delays and memory cost in the above scheme, because the total number of hosts is assumed to be smaller than 2 32 and using 48 bits as a primary key may result in an uneven directory tree, which causes unnecessary delays in operations.
In this scheme, we need to search through a list by comparing the primary keys of a list to find an SH, because we allow collisions on a table entry. We use hash value v to find the header of a list, where v = H 1 (IP G, ID H), and hash function H 1 is implemented using Knuth's multiplication method [16] , which can be computed in less than 100 clock cycles on Pentium-4 using C in Linux kernel. We extend the standard linear hashing scheme as a directory scheme to look up SH's. We start with a directory with 2 16 entries, and then double the directory size as the table population grows. We analyze the performance of the above directory schemes in the following. 
For a packet j, the probability that it belongs to an existing flow i is P [j ∈
. We assume that an address entry is expired after each on-period. Then we need to insert an address entry for a flow in each onoff cycle. The probability that packet j causes a table insertion for flow i
. Therefore, for packet j, the probability that it causes an insertion for flow i is P
We first analyze the performance of the multi-level directory scheme under the above traffic model. Figure 11 shows the lookup algorithm that decides the action for a packet of flow i, whose address is fallen into directory entry e. Consider level l directory with 2 k entries, where k = 16 when l = 1, and k = 8, when 2 ≤ l ≤ 5. Let N l be the current flow population in level l and its sub-directories. We know N 1 = N active . Assume client addresses are uniformly distributed across the whole directory, the expected population in the level l
Assume packet j arrived at directory level l is fallen into an entry e with a uniform probability of
be the probability that entry e is not occupied currently (i.e., flag F = 0); p
is the probability that entry e is currently occupied by a single flow (i.e., flag F = 1), and
is the probability that entry e is currently occupied by more than one flow (i.e., flag F = 2), and thus it is expanded into the next level l + 1 (for l < 5). Then we have p 
where d f lag is the delay to determine the flag value of a directory entry, d insert is the delay to insert client information into an entry, d compare is the delay to compare the destination of a packet with that of an existing entry, d expand is the delay to expand a sub-directory in the next level, d down is the delay to step down into the next-level sub-directory, and E l+1 insert (i, i ) is the delay to insert two distinct entries, i and i , into a newly-expanded sub-directory at level l + 1, as defined in Equation 2.
where 2 ≤ l ≤ 4. For E 
In summary, for the packets of flow i, the expected delay of an address insertion is D We now analyze the performance of the linear hashing directory scheme. Assume we initialize the directory withÑ 0 entries, sayÑ 0 = 2 8 . Assume we have a perfect hashing function, then the memory cost of the single-level directory
We only expand the directory after 2 k−1 ·Ñ 0 collisions.
For each packet, we need to first search the table to check if it has a corresponding entry there. If not, we then insert an address entry. The probability that the address of the packet is hashed into an empty directory entry is
, while the probability that its address is hashed into an occupied directory entry is p 1 = 1 − p 0 . The search procedure of linear hashing is shown in Figure 12 . is the delay to compare the address of the packet with the address in a name entry, and d next is the delay to access the next entry on a list. We then have And the expected lookup/insertion delay of packets of flow i is
We measure the delay of memory read/write and hashing computation in Linux kernel and plug in these parameters into our models. Fig.13 shows the comparison of the multi-level approach with a perfect linear hashing approach.
For a uniform distribution of addresses, although the multi-level approach does well for a small population, its delay grows as the population increases. We also test the multi-level approach with a skewed input, in which all address entries are in a single directory entry at the first level and they are uniformly distributed below the first level. In this case, the delay of multi-level approach is increased significantly. While the linear hashing approach keeps a constant delay under the assumption of a perfect hashing function. In addition, the memory cost of the hashing approach is less compared with the multi-level approach, as shown in Fig.13 .b. We also conduct simulations to evaluate the two schemes. We use a multiplication approach for fast computing hash values, and generate a random set of address lookups. Fig.14 .a shows the mean delay of the hashing scheme is significantly better than the multi-level scheme.
Fig.14.b shows that the memory cost of the hashing scheme is also better than the multi-level scheme.
Conclusion and Ongoing Work
We have proposed the SNS framework to protect critical resources from unauthorized accesses and DOS attacks. Through the resource virtualization and dynamic name binding, we can build a distributed filtering scheme to enforce packet authentication. We have described the basic design of the SNS framework, the SNS naming schemes and the SNS authenticated packet forwarding. We have further addressed the performance and scalability issues in the authenticated packet forwarding. Based on our prototype on Linux, we have shown the feasibility of implementing SNS on regular Linux machines.
We have also designed fast secure-handle schemes to address the scalability issue in fast address translation.
To fully exploit the advantages of SNS, we still face several challenges such as further improving service availability and scalability. For example, we need to further protect SCs from attacks (such as packet replay and flooding) because they are exposed to attackers. We will address this issue from two perspectives.
First, we will build a fast filter scheme on these SCs using Bloom Filter [17] in order to stop attacking packets into SNS domains. The main tradeoff of this scheme is between computation costs and probabilities that invalid packets penetrate the filter. Furthermore, we will investigate the effect of reconstructing dynamic packet forwarding paths to defeat attacks through resources within SNS domains and potential resources from a third party between SNS domains. Currently, we are working on these issues and implementing the complete SNS framework for further investigation.
